The Images of Incumbents in Great Britain and the United States by Cain, Bruce E. et al.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125
THE IMAGES OF INCUMBENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
Bruce E. Cain 
California Institute of Tech nology 
John A. Ferejohn 
Stanford University 
Morris P. Fiorina 
Harvard University 
,��1\lUTf Op 
�,.. )'�<:: � � 
.!:f
0 
;; bu C'l 
• 
-< 
'"""' 
. 
� /:; � �l--1: ,....;;;, It '" 
SJtALL �p..�� 
Prepared for Delivery at the 
Canadian Political Science Association, 
The University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, June 7, 1983.
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 475
April 1983
ABSTRACT 
Incumbents in s ingle member, s imple plurality systems strive to 
develop name recognition and po sitiv e  images of themselves. We propo se 
to analyze the images that constituents in Great Britain and the United 
States hav e of their MPs and Congressmen and to measure the impact 
which incumbent activities have on tho se images. We also examine the 
normativ e  expectations that constituents in both countries have of 
their representativ es and how these expectations shape their 
evaluations. 
The data for this study comes from matching elite and voter 
surveys in Great Britain and the United States. Our results can be 
summarized as follows: I) a large percentage of constituents in both 
countries believe that casework and protecting district intere sts are 
the most important functions of the representativ e; 2) tho se from 
working class, less well educated backgrounds are more inclined to 
prefer a service role for their representative than a policy role; 3) 
the evaluations that constituents have of their representat ives 
reflects the importance of constituency service in their priorities as 
well; and 4) that representatives who undertake high levels of 
constituency service hav e better const ituent images than other 
representatives. 
THE IMAGES OF INCUMBENTS IN 
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
Bruce E. Cain 
John A. Ferejohn 
Morris P. Fiorina 
The aphorism "it doe sn't matter what they say about you as long as 
they spell your name correctly" explains an important aspect of 
legislator behavior � the quest for name recognition -- but b eing 
known per se is not enough for most incumbents. A highly salient 
negativ e  image can be more troublesome than a less salient po sitive 
image. In the worst case,  it may bring a strong electoral challenge, 
but at the v ery least, there can be other adverse consequences. For 
instance, US Congressmen with image problems may have diff iculty 
raising funds or f inding campaign volunteers while British MPs with 
image problems may find that they have caused serious morale problems 
in the local party or provoked a f ight over their readoption. 
Consequently , representatives who want to stay in off ice must try to 
create po sitiv e  images of themselves. Fenno calls the activities that 
produce these images the representativ e's home style (Fenno, 1 97 8) . 
While Fenno conceived of home style as an incumbent's unique, 
indiv idualized respo nse to his district and the natural inclinations of 
his personality, it is equally apparent that the public shares certain 
stylized perceptions of representativ es and their responsibilities, 
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including expectations about what representatives should be doing in 
office . These expe ctations derive in part from collDllOn wisdom about how 
a country's legislative system works, but also from a constituent' s  
class, ethnic, age and social-�conomic background .  To the extent that 
role expectations differ in various districts, representatives will 
have to mold their homestyles accordingly . 
If representatives are successful in meeting these expectations, 
their images will benefit and their electoral bases will be more 
secure. Conversely, not meeting constituent expectations can adversely 
affect their images and weaken their electoral bases. This paper will 
explore the expectations and images that constituents in Great Britain 
and the United States have of their representatives, and the 
relationship between what incumbents actually do and how their 
constituents perceive them. 
THE ROLE EXPECTATIONS OF CONGRESSMEN AND MPS 
One of the classic normative questions in political science 
concerns what representatives should do in off ice . In the framework of 
political theory, a representative's duties are determined by the 
theorist's overall conception of the state's responsibilities . Thus, 
the Benthamite representative makes laws that maximize the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number, the Lockean representative 
legislates in order to eliminate the inconveniences of property and 
per sonal in se curity in the state of nature, the Hegelian representative 
represents one of the major interests in civil society, and so on 
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(Bentham, The Constitutional Code, p. 160; Locke, The Second Treatise, 
p. 84-91; Regel, Philosophy of Right, p. 1 93-208).
Legislative duties in the real world do not always match so 
logically with the state's responsibilities, partly because they often 
evolve informally and unintentionally . Part of the representative' s 
job in contemporary British and American government has a direct 
constitutional source, but other tasks seem to have developed as 
increasingly customary demands that constituents place upon their 
Congressmen and MP s .  Since representatives often find it advantageous 
to encourage these demands, new responsibilities can evolve in 
unforeseen ways from the gradual discovery by representatives and their 
constituents of their complementary interest s .  
If the importance assigned t o  various tasks can affect the way 
representatives are evaluated, then it is useful to know how 
constituents in Great Britain and the U . S .  rank these responsibilities .  
However, asking a comparable question that i s  also sensitive to 
important differences in the American and British political systems is 
no simple matter. The 1 97 8  CPS survey of American voters showed 
respondents a list of "activities that occupy members of the U . S .  Rouse 
of Representatives as part of their job" and asked them to "rank the 
activities in order of importance . "  We followed the same procedure to 
the greatest extent possible in a study we conducted with Gallup in May 
1 979, but we felt that it was necessary to make some changes in the 
wording of the alternatives British respondents were asked to rank. l A 
comparison of the two lists is shown below: 
United States 
1 .  Helping people in the district 
who have personal problems with 
the government 
2. Making sure the district gets
its fair share of government money 
and projects 
3 .  Keeping track of the way 
gov ernment agencies are carrying 
out laws passed by Congress 
4. Keeping in touch with the
people about what the gov ernment 
is doing 
5 .  Working in Congress on bills 
concerning national issues 
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United Kingdom 
1 .  Helping people in the 
constituency who have personal 
problems with the government 
2. Protecting the interests of
the constituency 
3 .  Keeping track of civil 
servants 
4. Keeping in touch with the
people about what the government 
is doing 
5 .  Debating and voting in 
Parliament 
In cro ss-national survey work, the interests of comparability 
frequently conflict with those of sensitivity to inter-country 
differences, and this is nowhere more evident than in the third 
response. Members of Parliament have not traditionally had access to 
civil servants, nor have committees in Parliament had the power to 
subpo ena and investigate that Congressional committees enjoy ( Butt, 
1 96 7; Beloff and Peele, 1 980, chapter 4) . Members can, of course, 
question a minister who is responsible for a particular department of 
the civil service, but for the mo st part investigations of 
administrativ e abuse are handled by the national Ombudsman (Gregory and 
Hutchesson, 1 97 5 ) .  However, these differences should not be 
exaggerated since it is also true that MPs have retained their right to 
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refer such cases directly to the Ombudsman and can use the threat of 
adv erse publicity and hostile questions in the House as well as their 
informal contacts with ministers to put pressure on off ending 
bureaucrats (Chester and Bowring, 1 962; Cain and Ritchie, 1 982; Norton, 
1982) . So while keeping track of agencies has more meaning in the 
context of the American system than keeping track of civil servants 
does in that of the British, it seemed to us sufficiently meaningful in 
the latter to warrant inclusion . 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 shows the di stribution of responses in both countries to 
the question "which of these activities is the most important . "  To 
ease the burden of discussion, the first activity on the list will be 
called "helping people, " the second will be called "protecting the 
district, " the third will be called "oversight, 11 the fourth will be 
called "keeping in touch, " and the fifth will be called "policy ." The 
American respondents ranked these activities in the order : keeping in 
touch, policy, protecting the district, oversight and helping people. 
The British respondents ranked the alternatives in the order : 
protecting the district, keeping in touch, helping people, policy and 
oversight. One obvious and important difference between the rankings 
in the two countries,  as expected, is that oversight was not rated as 
highly by the British respondents as it was by the Americans. The 
former rated its importance a distant last while the latter rated it a 
clo se fourth. Thus, it is reassuring to see that what is expected of 
TABLE 1 
ROLE OF REPRESENTATIVE 
United States 
Helping People 11% 
(254) 
Protecting District 15% 
(355) 
Oversight 15% 
(350} 
Keeping in Touch 30% 
(683) 
Policy 19% 
(440) 
Don't Know o r  All or None 10% 
(222) 
2304 
5a 
United Kingdom 
--
19% 
(387) 
26% 
(524) 
4% 
(88) 
24% 
(477) 
11% 
(227) 
16% 
(328) 
2031 
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representatives in both countries reflects to some degree objectiv e  
differences i n  how the two political systems work. 
Institutional differences may also account for the les ser 
importance of the policy role in Great Britain. The virtual 
irrelevance of the backbench MP to the policy-making pro cess has been 
the subject of much academic and journalistic discussion (Hanson and 
Crick, 1 970; Walkland and Ryle, 1 977; Richards, 1 97 2; Barker and Rush, 
1 970) . The individual MP cannot change legislation in committee and 
until recently has been severely constrained by the norms of party 
discipline (Jackson, 1 96 8; Norton, 1 97 5 ,  1 980 ) . Much of the discussion 
about Parliamentary reform in the sixties and seventies centered on the 
question o f  how to giv e  individual Members a more meaningful role in 
legislation. By contrast, Congressmen have far more power over 
legislation. In recent years, backbench British MPs hav e  tried to get 
more policy making responsibility while American Congressmen appear to 
be trying to avoid policy responsibility, especially in controversial 
areas. Indeed, some have argued that Congressmen hav e accentuated 
their casework and pork barreling roles because they entail less risk 
than staking out positions on policies (Fiorina, 1 97 7 ) . There is then 
the irony that the Congressmen hav e a more meaningful policy role but 
wish that they did not, while backbench MPs do not but wish that they 
did. 
A second contrast between the British and American samples is that 
the category of helping people with personal problems was ranked higher 
by the British constituents than by the American . The "so cial worker" 
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role, as some call it, was ranked by nearly a fifth of the British 
sample as the single most important activity undertaken by an M. P .  In 
fact, 40 percent of the British sample ranked helping people who have 
personal problems with the government as one of the top two most 
important activities an MP undertakes. This may seem surprising since 
there has been far more attention to the casework responsibilities of 
Congressmen than MPs and to the growth of their staff resources to 
accommodate and in some sense, promote -- this demand (Fenno , 1 97 8; 
Fiorina, 1 97 7; Mayhew, 1 974; Macartney, 1 97 5; Cranor and We stphal, 
1978; Parker, 1 97 9; Parker and Davidson, 1 97 9; Frantzich, 1979; 
Johannes,  1 97 8; Yiannakis,  1981) . 
For the same reason, it is also surprising that protecting the 
interests of the con stituency was rated as highly as it was by the 
British respondents. To be sure, since both systems employ single 
member, s imple plurality districts, representatives in both countries 
hav e distinctiv e  territorial interests to defend. Still, the weaker 
party system and the power of the committees would seem to make this 
role more meaningful in the U . S. than in the U.K. In the American 
context, securing projects and money for the district is the 
traditional pork barreling function of the Congressmen, a function that 
would seem altogether absent in Great Britain. However, almost all of 
the MPs we interviewed in our study mentioned many specific things they 
did for their constituencies such as leading a campaign to prevent the 
closing of a local hospital, urging the government to have a road 
constructed, helping raise funds for the local football team, helping 
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to organize a job fair in areas of high unemployment, to mention just a 
f ew. Moreover, the discovery that British constituents think that 
protecting the interests of the local constituency is v ery important is 
consistent with previous evidence that selection committees value a 
candidate with a feel for local concerns (Ranney, 1 965, p. 1 14-1 17) . 
Judging from the respo nses in our two samples, constituents in 
both countries also as sign considerable importance to keeping in touch. 
Partly , this reflects the preceding point that constituents want their 
representatives to have a good sense of their districts' particular 
concerns. However, it may also be related to whether people think that 
their representatives should be trustees or delegates .  Delegates are 
representativ es who tailor their positions to tho se who elect them: 
trustees represent the interests of their constituents by exercising 
their judgment as to what is best for their constituents (Pitkin, 
1 97 8) . There is some suggestion in the US data that the keeping in 
touch function and the delegate role might be connected. Tho se who 
thought that keeping in touch was most important in the U. S. were more 
inclined to prefer the delegate to trustee role : 64 percent of tho se 
who said that keeping in touch was the most important function of the 
representativ e  also said they believed that the representativ e  should 
be a delegate while 25 percent of them said that the representative 
should be a trustee whereas 51 percent of tho se who said that policy­
making was most important favored the delegate role while 33 percent 
favored the trustee role. Unfortunately , we lack comparable data in 
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the British sample so we cannot say whether there is any relationship 
there as well. 
DIFFERING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATION 
Not only were there significant cross-national differences in the 
rankings of alternative legislator activities, but there were also 
signficant differences acro ss groups in both countries. In particular, 
there are observable educational, class, ethnic and party variations in 
the expectations that British and U.S. constituents have of their 
representatives. Tables 2 and 3 show the rankings of the role 
importance items by different groups in the population. The numbers 
represent the percentage of those in each group who b elieve that a 
given role is the most important one that a representative has. Since 
the bivariate percentages may themselves be spurious, the inferences we 
draw are based on a multivariate model found in Appendix A .  
[ Insert Tables 2 and 3 here ] 
The first thing these tables show is that the differences in group 
rankings were somewhat more pronounced in the U.S. than in the British 
data. There were clear variations in the absolute percentages who 
thought that a given role was mo st important, but there were few 
differences in the rankings acro ss the various groups in Britain. By 
contrast, there were marked differences in group rankings as well as in 
the absolute percentages in the U.S. sample. 
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Another general observation is that if we distinguish the policy 
item from the helping people, keeping in touch and protecting district 
interests items, better educated, middle class individuals in both 
countries favored a more policy-oriented role for their representatives 
while less well educated, working class individuals favored a more 
service-oriented role. The education effect was particularly striking. 
In the U.S., 40 percent of the college educated respondents thought 
that the policy role was the Congressman's most important function 
whereas only 17 percent of those with less than a high school education 
thought so. The former ranked policy number one while the latter 
ranked it third behind keeping in touch and protecting the interests of 
the district. The effect was equally strong in Great Britain. Those 
who left school at the age of 14 or less ranked policy fourth with 9 
percent: those who stayed in school beyond the age of 1 8  ranked policy 
a close second with 32 percent. The relationship between education and 
preferring a policy role remained significant in both countries in the 
multivariate equation (see Appendix A). At the same time, the least 
well educated individuals in both countries ranked keeping in touch 
first and protecting the interests of the district second. Helping 
people, which most closely proxies the casework role, was also more 
heavily favored by this group, although its ranking did not change in 
either instance • 
Although the relationships are somewhat harder to see in the 
bivariate tables than in the multivariate equation, class was also 
signf icantly related to the ranking of policy and service functions • 
11 
Characteri stically, the rankings of the working and middle class groups 
were identical in the British data, but the percentages varied 
somewhat. Ten percent of the working class individuals indicated that 
policy was the mo st important role of the MP whereas 17 percent of the 
middle class individuals felt this way. Conversely, 26 percent of the 
working class in the sample felt that helping people was the mo st 
important role whereas 20 percent of the middle class said so . 
Controlling for the other variables did not weaken this relationship, 
as the multivariate equation shows. As with education, the U . S. data 
show both a percentage and ranking difference : the middle class 
respondents placed policy second at 27 percent while the working class 
respondents ranked it fourth at 16 percent. 
Very much related to class and educational d ifferences in the U . S .  
i s  the importance of race . Black respondents ordered activ ities very 
diff erently from the rest of the population: they ranked policy as the 
least important activ ity and ranked protecting the interests of the 
district and helping people as second and third respectively. In fact, 
as a group, they placed a higher prior ity on helping people than any 
other group in the sample both in terms of the percentage who rated it 
as most important and in the rank order they ass igned to it . To some 
extent, of course, this racial difference merely reflects the 
educational and class biases observed earlier, but the fact remains 
that even when other variables were controlled for in the multivariate 
equation, racial dif ferences in representational priorities remained. 
12  
These educational, class and racial differences are not altogether 
surprising. Political scientists hav e  long known that there were 
related differences in citizen knowledge about the issues, 
participation and interest in politics (Campbell et al, 1 960). One 
major study of participation in America found that although the better 
educated, higher income indiv iduals were more l ikely to participate in 
all ways ( i. e . voting, particularized contact, coUDDunity participation 
and campaign activ ity ) ,  the gap in participation was smallest with 
respect to what they called "particularized contact, "  or casework 
(Verba and Nie, 1 97 2, p. 132) . 
The f inding of a class ,  educational and racial preference for 
casework service calls to mind Fenno' s  contention that a 
representativ e's home style will be influenced by the kind of district 
he represents (Fenno , 1 97 8 ) . The choice of an issue home style as 
opposed to a more service or district home style w ill be shaped in part 
by the expectations that constituents have of what is mo st important. 
This is not to say that incumbents can not shape the expectations of 
their constituents, but it does mean that a representative who wants to 
be issue oriented in a working class, low education distr ict may 
receive less reward from his constituents that someone who adopts an 
issue orientation in a middle class, high education district. 
Differences in the priorities of groups other than class,  
education and race are less signf icant and need be noted only briefly . 
Age diff erences were stronger in the U . S .  than in the U.K. Younger 
const ituents in both countr ies seemed more inclined to think that 
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keeping in touch was important. Older constituents, by contrast, 
thought that helping people and oversight were more important. Union 
membership mattered more in Great Britain, with union members in both 
countries emphasizing policy more and helping peopl e less. Finally, 
there were some scattered party effects worth noting. Liberal s 
emphasized protecting the interests of the district more than tho se 
from other parties, which is consistent with the "parish pump politics" 
image they projected in the sixties and seventies. Conservatives 
placed somewhat greater emphasis on policy, although the difference 
weakened when all the other socio-economic variables were control led 
for. In the U. S. , Republicans tended to place less emphasis on the 
helping people role,  but otherwise there were no real party 
di stinctions. 
REPRESENTATIVES AND PARTY RESPONSIBILITY 
Another expectation that is crucial to the way that con stituents 
view their representativ es is the extent to which Congressmen or MPs 
are expected to adhere to the party line when voting on legislation 
rather than exercise their own judgment. There is reason to expect a 
priori that there should be differences in the attitudes of the British 
and American publics on this question. The post-war British party 
sy stem has until recently been characterized by high level s  of party 
discipl ine, particularly when compared to the U. S. Support in the 
President's party in the House ranged from 72 percent in 1 953-54 to 61  
percent in 1 977-78 (Fiorina, 1 980 , p.  3 8) . By comparison, the 
14 
percentage of divisions in Parliament witnessing any dissenting votes 
in Great Britain has ranged from .5 percent in 1 964-66 to 28 percent in 
1 974-7 9 (Norton, 1 9 80, p. 428 ) .  As the data suggests ,  the situation in 
Great Britain has changed in recent years : backbench rebellions have 
increased to such an extent that traditional notions about motions of 
confidence and the customs surrounding resignations hav e had to be 
altered considerably ( Norton, 1 97 8; Schwartz, 1 980) . But if 
backbenchers are rebelling more, the question is whether their 
constituents condone such independence from the parties? 
The 1 97 8  CPS and 1 97 9  Gallup studies included questions that 
explored this question. Respondents were asked to say whether they 
thought a representativ e  should "support the position their parties 
take when something comes up for a vote, or should they make up their 
own minds regardl ess of how their parties want them to vote. " The 
three alternatives they were asked to choo se from were "support the 
party, "  "it depends, " and ''make up their own minds." Tabl e 4 shows the 
whole sample responses in both countries. 
[Insert Tabl e 4 here] 
As the data indicate, there are signficant and predictable cro ss­
national differences to the responses to these questions, although not 
as large as one might suppose. The British respondents were less 
inclined to say that representativ es should make up their own mind and 
more inclined to say that the repre sentatives should support their 
party. This is consistent with the observation that the British party 
14a 
TABLE 4 
PARTY OR CONSCIENCE 
United States United Kingdom 
--
Support Party 17% 22% 
(399) (453) 
Depends 8% 18% 
(195) (362) 
Make Up Own Mind 69% 54% 
(1580) (1087) 
Don't Know 6% 6% 
(130) (129) 
n 2304 2031 
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system is more disciplined than the American. Nonetheless, the 
majority of respondents in both countries said that representatives 
should make up their own minds, which suggests a surprising lack of 
support for Parliamentary discipline among the British public. 
Clearly, the unpopularity of recent governments, the trend away from 
the two major parties and towards the Liberals, Nationalists and SDP, 
and the growing unhappiness of voters, journalists and academics with 
the British political system is reflected in the British respondents' 
desire to see their representatives act independently. Thus, the new 
patterns of backbench rebellion appear to be consistent with public 
role expectations. 
Breaking the "party or conscience" question down by groups reveals 
that there are some important differences in both samples. Once again, 
education is a significant variable, although the effect is not the 
same in both countries as it was for the role expectations question. 
Eighty percent of the college educated individuals in the U. S. said 
that representatives should make up their own minds whereas 68 percent 
of those with less than a high school education said so. This 
relationship persists even after controlling for other variables (see 
Appendix A). On the other hand, better educated individuals in Britain 
were more likely to say that the representative should support the 
party position or that it depends. This probably reflects the fact 
that the better educated British respondents were torn between their 
understanding of how the British parliamentary system should operate 
and their alienation from the actual workings of the party system. 
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[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
One might expect class differences to be more signif icant in Great 
Britain, especially in the l ight of Drucker's contention that loyalty 
is crucial to the working class, Labour ethos (Drucker, 1979).
However, the evidence for that hypothesis is small and statistical ly 
insignificant, and in any case, is stronger among Democrats in the 
United States than it is among Labourites in Britain. (See Table A . 3  
in Appendix A . )  
All in all, group differences were greater in the American than 
the British data, and in general, crossnational differences were 
greater than group differences within each country. What then can we 
say about the expectations that British and American constituents have 
of their representatives? First , it is apparent that they expect them 
to play an act ive part in their districts and constituencies . While 
there were important educational and class differences in both 
countries, even the most educated and middle class individuals expect 
their representatives to be accessible, do casework and further the 
interests of their districts. Secondly, while there were important 
crossnational differences in the degree of party loyalty constituents 
expe cted from their representat ives, a majority in both countries 
prefered their representatives to make up their own minds and not 
simply follow the l ead of the parties. 
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TABLE 5 
PARTY OR CONSCIENCE BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS·-- UNITED STATES 
Support Party 
Depends 
Own Mind 
Support Party 
Depends 
Own Mind 
All Union 
18% 18% 
9% 8% 
73% 74% 
Middle 
> 65 Class 
16% 16% 
12% 8% 
72% 76% 
College < High School Black < 21 Male 
11% 22% 
9% 10% 
80% 68% 
Working 
Class Democrats 
21% 21% 
10% 10% 
69% 69% 
22% 31% 21% 
10% 8% 10% 
68% 61% 69% 
Republicans Independents 
17% 18% 
8% 8% 
75% 74% 
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TABLE 6 
PARTY OR CONSCIENCE BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS -- UNITED KINGDOM 
Left School Completed School Working 
All Union < 14 > 19 Class 
-
-
Support 
Party 24% 27% 25% 24% 25% 
Depends 19% 17% 15% 27% 19% 
Own Mind 57% 56% 60% 49% 5 G% 
< 20 � 65 Conservative Labour Liberal 
--
-
Support 
Party 28% 23% 24% 27% 19% 
Depends 14% 19% 22% 16% 16% 
Own Mind 58% 58% 54% 56% 65% 
Middle 
Class 
22% 
19% 
597. 
Male 
26% 
19% 
55% 
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THE IMAGES OF INCUMBENTS 
Incumbents who wish to make their positions more secure need to to 
develop favorable images for themselves among their voters. However, 
as with name recognition, incumbent images can be more easily developed 
in certain types of political systems and with certain voters than 
others. Given important differences between the more disciplined and 
nationalized British party system and the less disciplined and 
individualized American party system, we might legitimately wonder 
whether MPs can be as successful at developing positive images of 
themselves as Congressmen and whether their home styles will have as 
much impact upon their constituents. 
We can find some evidence on this point in a question that asked 
British and American constituents whether there was anything in 
particular that they liked about their incumbents. Table 7 breaks 
these responses down by country and party. The data clearly show that 
Congressmen have been more successful than their parliamentary 
counterparts in developing positive images of themselves in their 
constituents' eyes. Whereas 43 percent of the U.S. sample claimed that 
they could say what they liked about the incumbent, only 25 percent of 
the British sample said so. On the face of it then, it might appear 
that systemic differences do matter. However, a closer look raises 
some questions. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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TABLE 7 
LIKES-DISLIKES -- MARGINALS (RUNNING INCUMBENTS) 
Like Anything in 
Particular 
Do Not 
Dislikes Something 
in Particular 
Do Not 
United States 
All 
43% 
(878) 
57% 
(ll51) 
ll% 
(226) 
89% 
(1803) 
Dem 
41% 
(516) 
59% 
(736) 
11% 
(134) 
89% 
(lll8) 
�
47% 
(362) 
53% 
(415) 
12% 
(92) 
88% 
(685) 
All 
25% 
(438) 
75% 
(1329) 
13% 
(226) 
87% 
(1541) 
United Kingdom 
Cons 
20% 
(206) 
80% 
(834) 
12% 
(124) 
88% 
(916) 
Lab 
27% 
(172) 
73% 
(465) 
16.5% 
(105) 
83.5% 
(532) 
Lib 
56% 
(31) 
44% 
(24) 
14.5% 
(8) 
86.5% 
(47) 
18 
To begin with, while American respondents were more able to say 
what they liked about their representatives, the British respondents 
were more able to say what they disliked about their representatives. 
This is curious since systemic differences ought to affect negative 
images as much as positive ones. Moreover, the aesymetry between 
negative and positive responses was not evident for those with Liberal 
incumbents since 56 percent of those with Liberal incumbents were able 
to say what they liked about their representatives. Perhaps, this can 
be explained by the fact that the "parish pump" tactics of the Liberal 
party succeeded in making their candidates more visible to their 
constituents. On the other hand, the reluctance of constituents with 
Conservative and Labour MPs to say something nice about their 
representatives may reflect the public's general dieatisfaction with 
the parties that have governed them in the poet war period. le there 
any way that these two explanations can be distinguished? 
One possibility is to look at the content of the images 
themselves. If indeed the comparative inability of the British 
respondents to say something positive about their representatives is 
generated by their alienation with the party system in Great Britain, 
then we might expect what they say about their incumbents to reflect 
this in some way. We see in Table 8 that fifteen percent of the 
positive references in the U.S. sample dealt with the incumbent'e party 
or policy views as compared to only 1 percent of the British positive 
references. At the same time, 33 percent of the negative references in 
the British sample fell into the party/policy category as compared to 
1 9  
25 percent in the U. S. sample. It is possible therefore that had this 
poll been taken in happier times, British constituents might have made 
more positive party/policy references and fewer negative ones, and that 
this might have increased the number of positive references. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Table 8 also reveals some interesting data on another point; 
namely, the relative risklessness of a constituency strategy as 
compared to a policy strategy. The aggregate ratios of positive to 
negative references for the party/policy category were lower than those 
for the constituency attentiveness and personal characteristics 
categories. In other words, people were more likely to think of 
something bad to say in the policy/party category than in the other 
two, which means that if incumbents can control the way that their 
constituents see them, they run fewer risks by emphasizing their
personality and constituency service than by touting their views on 
policies (Parker and Davidson, 1 97 9 ) . The implications of this are 
presumably not lost on incumbents. 
We speculated earlier that the role expectations constituents have 
of their representatives can constrain the choice of home style. A 
corollary to that idea is that role expectations may also constitute a 
frame of reference for constituents if the way that constituents 
evaluate their incumbents is influenced by the role that they think 
that their representatives should be playing. Thus, people who believe 
that the policy making role of the representative is most important may 
TABLE 8 
A COMPARISON OF OPEN-ENDED EVALUATIONS 
IN GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES 
United States 
Positive Negative 
Constituency Attentiveness 32% 11% 
(245) (21) 
Personal/General 45% 59% 
(344) (115) 
Party/Policy 15% 25% 
(111) ( 49) 
Other 8% 5% 
62 ) ( 9 ) 
n 762 194 
19a 
United Kingdom 
Positive Negative 
42% 15% 
(182) (34) 
53% 44% 
(229) ( 98) 
1% 33% 
( 4 ) (73) 
4% 8% 
( 16) (17) 
431 222 
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be more inclined to evaluate their incumbents in terms of their policy 
positions, and people who think that the casework role of the 
representative is more important may be more inclined to evaluate their 
incumbents in terms of their casework activity. Table 9 is an attempt 
to test this hypothesis by looking at the relationship between 
responses to the role expectation question and those to the open-ended 
likes and dislikes questions. 
[Insert Table 9 here ]
We would expect those who think that the policy role is most 
important to refer more frequently to the policies of the incumbent 
than those who think that casework is the most important. Conversely, 
those who think that the casework role is most important should refer 
more frequently to the incumbent's casework activities than those who 
think that the policy role is most important. Similar predictions can 
be made for those who rank policy or casework last, policy or casework 
in the top two, and so on. 
This pattern is more clearly seen in the British data than in the 
U.S. United States constituents who thought that the policy role was 
most important were more likely to mention the incumbent's policy 
stands positively than were those who thought that casework was most 
important, but the same is not true for negative mentions of policies. 
The contrast is somewhat sharper when we compare instances where policy 
was ranked first or in the top two and casework was ranked last or in 
the bottom two with instances where casework was ranked first or in the 
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top two and policy was ranked last or in the bottom two. In both sets 
of comparisons, when the policy-making role was ranked more highly, 
negative and positive references to the policy stands of the incumbent 
increased. Conversely, we would expect the number of constituency 
references to increase when the casework role was more highly ranked, 
but this seems to be true only for negative references in the U. S. 
The relationships more clearly conform to our expectations in the 
British data. Since there were too few positive references to the 
policy stands of the incumbent MPs to analyze, our attention must be 
restricted to negative policy references. There, policy references 
increased considerably when the policy making role was ranked most 
highly and decreased when casework was ranked most highly. At the same 
time, constituency references tended to increase when the casework role 
was rated highest and decreased when the policy making role was rated 
highest, especially in the positive reference category, 
Hence, there is evidence of a correlation between what people 
thought was the most important aspect of a representative's job and 
their evaluations of the incumbent. This means that the basis of how 
representatives are judged will vary to some degree with the role that 
their constituents think they should be playing, which returns us to 
the point that certain activities will be more rewarded or punished in 
some kinds of districts as opposed to others. 
22 
INCUMBENT ACTIVITIES AND INCUMBENT IMAGES 
It is Fenno's contention that U. S. Congressmen present themselves 
to their constituents in a manner that is consistent with the makeup of 
their districts and their personalities. The incumbent's 
"presentation, " or image, is based on what he or she says or does in 
the course of meeting and dealing with district residents. Thus, 
incumbents can to some degree control the images that constituents have 
of them by their choice of activities. Those who wish to establish or 
improve their images will try to increase the number of favorable 
contacts they have their constituents -- more personal visits, high 
staff visibility, aggressive casework solicitation, mailings, TV 
appearances, weekly columns in the local newspaper and the like. 
To say that incumbents have some control over their images through 
their activities is not to say that they have total control. The ease 
of getting a message through to constituents will be determined by 
their education, class and inherent political interest. Better 
educated, middle class and highly active individuals will more quickly 
assimilate the incumbent's message than less well educated, working 
class and politically indifferent ones. Moreover, the kind of appeal 
that succeeds with those who assimilate information quickly may be less 
appropriate to other constituents. For instance, we saw earlier that 
middle class, higher educated whites tended to favor policy-oriented 
representation whereas working class, lower educated minorities 
preferred service-oriented representation. Even more fundamentally, 
the message the incumbents try to convey to their constituents will be 
23 
colored by their partisan predispositions. So the incumbent's control 
over how he or she is evaluated is by no means complete. 
Even so, the question arises, "To what extent do incumbent 
activities affect the tendency of constituents to form positive or 
negative images of them?" This issue can be be explored in two ways. 
The first is simply to see whether those voters who report that they 
have had contact with the incumbent in various ways are more likely to 
say something positive or negative about him or her. This is displayed 
in Table 10 and in equations A. 4 and A. 5 in the Appendix. Both the 
bivariate and multivariate data show that many of these variables are 
in fact related to the formation of incumbent images. Contacts with 
the incumbent clearly make a difference in both countries, particularly 
the personal and citizen-initiated contacts. Whereas 43 percent of all 
the respondents in the U. S. sample and 25 percent of those in the 
British could mentioned something that they liked about the incumbent, 
80 percent of those in the U. S. who had personally met the incumbent in 
the U. S. and 55 percent in the U. K. were able to do so. Similarly 
knowing someone else who personally had met the incumbent and 
contacting the incumbent for help also significantly increased the 
percentage of those who could say what they liked or disliked about 
their incumbent. In both countries, passive contact � seeing the 
representative on TV, hearing him on radio, getting mail from him 
seems to be a somewhat less effective means of raising incumbent 
salience to constituents. 
24 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
In addition to the effects of incumbent contacts, other variables 
seem to be related as well. As one might reasonably expect, college 
educated individuals were more likely to form images of their incumbent 
than those without a college degree. Younger people were less able to 
say what they liked and disliked about the incumbent than older people. 
Partisanship also affected the way constituents saw their 
representatives, and the general level of attention individuals paid to 
politics and campaigns mattered quite apart from these other effects. 
However, one might wonder whether the respondents' self-reported 
contact might not be biased by their favorable or unfavorable 
impression of the incumbent. If respondents like their incumbents, 
then they might be more likely to get in contact with them. Of course, 
this would not explain why the dislikes item also increases with 
incumbent contact, but the probability of simultaneous causation cannot 
be casually dismissed. A second way to look at the relation between 
incumbent activity and images, which gets around the issue of a 
potentially biased contact response, is to see whether the probability 
of being able to say what the constituent likes or dislikes about the 
incumbent is in any way related to measures of incumbent activity. 
Tables 11 and 12 display the percent who could say what they liked and 
disliked about an incumbent as a function of various types of incumbent 
activity. In the U.S. data, soliciting cases, personal attention by 
the Member of Congress to casework and having a large casework staff 
seemed to heighten the salience of the incumbent considerably. 
TABLE 10 
ABILITY TO SAY WHAT RESPONDENT LIKES/DISLIKES 
ABOUT INCUMBENT BY CONTACT ITEMS AND OTHER VARIABLES 
24a 
United States United Kingdom 
Likes Dislikes Likes Dislikes 
All 43% 11% 25% 13% 
Personal Contact 80% 21% 55% 24% 
Passive Contact 54% 14% 36% 16% 
Citizen-Initiated Contact 78% 24% 55% 24% 
Secondhand Contacts 72% 19% 51% 18% 
Secondhand Citizen-Initiated 
Contacts 72% 21% 62% 15% 
High School/Left School 39% 10% 22% 13% 
(U.S.) 15 < x < 18 
College/In School 54% 20% 30% 15% 
(U.S.) �21 (U.K.) 
Low Attention 36% 6% 18% 5% 
High Attention 59% 21% 30% 17% 
< 21 23% 7% 5% 6% 
Same Party as Incumbent 52% 10% 33% 8% 
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Publicizing cases and handling state and local cases did not. In Great 
Britain, all of the constituency activities increased the incumbent's 
salience, but especially surgeries, an effort to publicize cases and 
taking on local cases. Apparently, what works best for incumbents in 
one country does not necessarily work best in another. 
[Insert Tables 11 and 12 here] 
Apart from the relationship between specific incumbent activities 
and the ability to form images of the incumbent, we can also look at 
the relationship between between a general measure of constituency 
aggressiveness and likes/dislikes.2 Here too we see that those who 
reside in districts where the incumbents undertake high levels of 
constituency work were more likely to be able to say something 
positive about the incumbent in both countries. Curiously, 
however, there is a significant difference between the two 
countries in the relationship between constituency activity and 
negative images of the incumbent. In Great Britain, incumbents who 
put forward a great deal of effort are rewarded by a lower 
probability that constituents will have anything bad to say about 
them, but in the U. S. , it increases the negative as well as 
positive mentions. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have looked at the expectations and images that 
constituents have of their representatives in the United States and 
25a 
TABLE 11 
RELATION BETWEEN ACTIVITIES AND ABILITY TO MENTION SOMETHING ABOUT INCUMBENT 
Solicit Cases on TV, Radio, Newspapers 
No Effort or by Newsletters Only 
Personal Attention by MC to Casework 
None 
Publicizes Cases 
Does not Publicize 
Handles Local Cases 
Does Not Handle Local Cases 
Caseworkers > 8 
Caseworkers = 0 
Highest General Index Score 
Lowest General Index Score 
Likes 
61% 
42% 
61% 
40% 
45% 
43% 
39% 
45% 
47% 
11% 
45% 
39% 
United States 
Dislikes 
18% 
11% 
21% 
6% 
10% 
11% 
9% 
13% 
13% 
11% 
15% 
9% 
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TABLE 12 
R ELATION BETWEEN ACTIVITIES AND ABILITY TO MENTION SOMETHING ABOUT INCUMBENT 
Seeks Out Cases 
Does Not Seek Out Cases 
Surgeries > 2 a Month 
Surgeries � 2 a Month
Effort to Publicize Cases 
No Effort 
Act on all Cases 
Does Not Act on all Cases 
Responsible for Local Cases 
Not Responsible 
Highest General Index Score 
Lowest General Index Score 
Likes 
27% 
22% 
38% 
21% 
28% 
16% 
27% 
23% 
28% 
16% 
48% 
21% 
United Kingdom 
Dislikes 
12% 
14% 
13% 
12% 
11% 
16% 
12% 
14% 
14% 
11% 
16% 
14% 
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Great Britain. We have seen that constituents in both countries expect 
a strong district orientation and a surprising degree of independence 
from their representatives. There also appear to be clear class, 
educational and racial differences in these role expectations, and we 
speculated that this may mean that representatives in different 
districts are rewarded for different things. The effect of contact 
with the incumbent upon constituent evaluations is quite strong in both 
countries. Clearly, engaging in various forms of constituency 
activities is one way to create a favorable image among constituents. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  The CPS 1978 congressional study sampled i n  108 districts. We 
were able to secure interviews with staff in 102 out of the 108 
districts. 
The Gal lup study samples 133 districts. During 1978 and 197 9 ,  we 
interviewed 146 MPs and agents, including some MPs and agents in the 
same constituencies and some in constituencies not sampled by Gallup. 
In this article, we have excluded agent interviews in constituencies in 
which we interviewed the MPs, the newly elected, and those outside the 
original Gallup sample. This gives us 101 observations : 69 MPs and 32 
agents. There is an obvious asymmetry between interviewing the AAs in 
the United States case and the MP in the British case that must be 
considered when making comparisons across these two data sets. For 
instance, it would not be valid to compare attitudes across the two 
samples since you would not be able to say what was cross-national in 
origin and what could be attributed to differences in the position of 
staff and representatives. On the other hand, most of the activity 
variables can be compared since there is less reason to expect a 
systematic response bias between staff and the representative on a 
question such as the number of cases processed per week. 
2 .  Several methods of aggregating -- factor analytic, Guttman 
scaling, and simple additive -- were tested and reported in an earlier 
paper, "Constituency Component : A Comparison of Casework in Great 
Britain and the United States, " ( forthcoming, Comparative Political 
Studies). Here we employ the simple additive measure. 
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APPENDIX A . l  
YIANHAKIS, D . 1  "The Grateful Electorate : Casework and CORRELATES OF ROLE IMPORTANCE -- UNITED STATES 
Congressional Elections, " American Journal of Polit ical 
Science 25 CAugust, 1981 ) : 568-580 .  
Keeping Track Protect Helping Keeping in 
of Civil Servants District People Touch Policy 
Union . 059 . 105t - . 099 - . 055 . 000 
( . 078) ( . 076) ( .  086) ( .  068) ( . 076) 
Age .010* - . 003 , 004* -.011* . 004* 
( .  002) ( . 002) ( .  002) ( . 001) ( . 002) 
High School -.076 - . 143* - , 067 . 002 , 330* 
(.091) ( . 088) ( . 096) ( .  081) (. 098) 
Some College .016 -, 328* - , 280* - , 038 ,578* 
( . lll) ( . 113) ( . 126) ( , 099) ( . 114) 
College -.227* - . 526* - , 245* - . 211* . 987* 
( . 120) ( . 126) ( . 131) ( . 105) ( . 115) 
Male - . 057 - . 076 - , Oll - . 020 . 150* 
( . 069) ( .  069) ( .  076) ( . 061) ( .  066) 
Middle Class . 109t - . 053 . 051 -. 1021" . 108t 
(.074) ( . 074) (. 082) (. 065) ( . 072) 
Same Party - . 006 .031 .062 - . 038 - . 015 
as Incumbent ( . 071) ( . 071) ( . 078) ( , 062) ( . 068) 
Democrat - . 112t . 198* - . 00 -, 049 -. 004 
(.083) ( , 083) c. 08) ( . 072) ( . 080) 
Republican -.070 . 203* - , 22* , 023 - . 005 
( . 093) ( , 096) ( , ll) ( 
• 
O!l2) (. 088) 
Black - . 079 . 246* ,23* -. 210* - . 173t 
( . 128) ( . ll2 ) ( . 12) ( . 111) ( . 131) 
Constant -1 . 31 - . 78 -1 . 19 . 18 -1 . 5  
R2 . 04 , 06 , 04 ,05 , 12 
2 
38 54 29 53 133 x 
* p < . 05 
t p < .10 
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APPENDIX A,3 
CORRELATES OF ROLE IMPORTANCE -- UNITED KINGDOM 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CORRELATES OF PARTY VERSUS CONSCIENCE QUESTION 
Keeping Track Protect Helping Keeping in United States United Kingdom 
of Civil Servants Cons tituency People Touch Policy 
Union . llt - . 038 
Union -.122 . 001 -. 129t . 062 . 149* ( . 07) ( . 064 ) 
( . 12 3 )  ( . 075) ( . 080) ( . 076) ( . 088) Age . 004* -. 053 
Left School . 27t -. 104 . 27 7* . 308* -. 542* (. 001) ( . 062 ) 
< 14 ( . 2 1 )  ( . 105 ) ( . 124) ( . 116) ( . 112) High School . 076 
Middle Class - . 09 -. 052 - . 126* , 067 . 203* ( . 0 7 7 )  
( . 11 )  ( . 068) ( .  072) ( . 070) {. 085) Some College . 160* 
Age � 20 -. 262* -. 11ot - . 03 2  , 198* . 019 ( , 096) 
( . 128) ( . 07 3 )  ( . 07 7 )  ( , 072) ( . 088) College , 325* 
Male . 242* . 020 - . 097t -, 128* . 205* 
( . 103) 
( . 109) ( . 06 7 )  ( . 071) ( . 069) (. 081) Male . 214* - , 08lt 
Conservative - . 082 . 083 - . 085 -, 150t . 251* ( , 060) ( . 057) 
( . 161) ( . 102) ( . 109) ( . 104) ( . 12 7 )  Middle Class . 133* , 075t 
Labour -. 114 -, 176* . 069 . 104 . 054 ( . 064) ( , 059) 
( . 145) ( . 094) ( . 098) (. 093) ( . 120) Same Party as Incumbent -, 058 - . 09 7  
Liberal -. 171 . 219* - . 02 3  -.  332* . 212t (. 061) ( . 064 ) 
( . 207) ( . 122) ( . 134 ) ( , 132} ( . 15 1 )  Democrat/Labour - . 167* - , 105t 
Same Party -.048 . 062 . 096t - . 079 - . 087 (. 071) (,079) 
as Incumbent ( . 125) ( . 076) ( , 080) ( , 078) ( . 094 ) Republican/Conservative - , 056 - , 086 
(. 083) ( , 08 1 )  
Constant -1 . 76 - . 37 - . 88 - , 84 -1 . 0 1  Black , 014 
R2 
( .  099) 
. 04 . 02 . 0 3  , 04 . 08 
x2 
Left School at < 14 ------ , 187* 14 22 24 39 63 (, 089) 
Liberal , 126 ------* p < . 05 ( ,  110) 
t p < . 10 
. 6 37 Constant . 503 
R2 . 04 . 015 
2 52 2 1  x 
* p < . 05 
;- p < . 10 
APPENDIX A . 4  
PROBIT O F  LIKES AND DISLIKES IN UNITED KINGDOM 
Likes Dislikes 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) 
Middle Claee - . 16* -.09 - . 09 . 05 . 0 6  
( . 08) ( . 07 )  ( . 07 )  ( . 09) ( . 08) 
Year Elected .016* - ---- - . 009* ---
( . 005) ( . 005) 
Personal Contact . 79* --- --- . 51* ---
( . 09 )  ( . 1 1 )  
Passive Contact . 67* ---- - . 28* ----
( . 08) ( . 09) 
Citizen-Initiated Contact . 40* -- - , 30* ----
(. lJ) ( , 14) 
Secondhand Contact . 39* ---- ---- , 15 ----
( . 11 )  ( . lJ) 
Secondhand Citizen- . 4 3* --- -- -. 33* 
Initiated Contact ( . 17 )  ( . 1 9 )  
Same Party a s  Incumbent . J3* . 42* . 45* -. 61* - . 50* 
( . 08) ( . 07 )  ( . 07 )  ( . 09) (,09) 
No Party ID . 12 . 02 . 02 - , 55* -, 53* 
( . 11) ( . 10) ( . 10) ( . 13) ( . 12 )  
Attention IDdel< . 01 . 06* , 065* . 06* . 09* 
( . 02 )  ( . 02 )  ( , 02 )  ( . 03) ( . 03) 
School > 21 . 0 3  . 19 - . 22+ -. 15 , 05 
( . 16) ( . 14 )  ( . 14 )  ( , 1 8) ( . 11) 
School • 19 - . 20 - . 1 5  - . 11 -,48 . 04 
( . 31 )  ( . 26) (.  26) ( . 4 1) ( . 30) 
Index of Activity ---- . 1 1* ---- ---- (:8f)( .02) 
15 � School � 18 - . 16* - . 06 -. 0 5  . 02 . 08 
( . 10) ( . 08) ( . 09) ( . 1 1 )  ( . 10) 
Ministerial Position . oos - . 02 - . 003 - . 09 - , 02 
(. 093) ( . 08) ( . 08) ( . 11) ( . 10) 
37 
(3) 
. 07 21 � Age � 2 9( . 08) 
---- JO � Age � 55
---- 55 � Age 
--- Seek Out Cases 
---- Surgeries > 2 a Month 
---- Responsible for Local 
Cases 
Effort to Publicize 
- . 50* 
( . 09 )  
- . 54* 
( . 12 )  
Constant 
i2 
. 08* 
(. 02) Chi-Square 
. 09 Percent Correctly 
( . 1 7 )  Predicted 
. 07 
( . 30) * p < . 05 
** p < . 01 ---- + p < . 10 
. 08 
( . 11) 
- . 07 
( . 10) 
APP ENDIX A.4 
(continued) 
Likes 
(1) (2) 
. oo - . 07 
( . 14 )  ( . 12 )  
. 1 8  . 19* 
( . 12 )  ( . 10) 
. 36* . J4* 
( . 1 3) ( . 11 ) 
---- ----
--- ----
---- ---
--- ---
-1 . 36 -2 . 7 2  
. 12 . 33 
126 358 
75% 79% 
38 
Dislikes 
(3) (1) (2) (3) 
- . 05 . 09 . OJ . 04 
( . l J) ( . 15 ) ( . 14) (.14) 
. 22* . 04 . 10 . 12 
( . 10) (. lJ) ( . 12 )  ( . 12) 
. J6* - . 01 . 0 1  -. 002 
( . 12 )  ( . 1 5 )  ( . 14 )  ( . 14) 
- . 06 -- -- . 0 3  
( . 09) ( . 10) 
. 4 9* --- --- . 08 
( . 08) ( . 10) 
. 16* --- --- . 1 9  
( .  0 7 )  ( . 09) 
. 0 2  -- -- -. 36* 
( . 09 )  (, 10) 
-1 . 36 - . 70 -1 . 22 -1 . 2 3  
. 10 . 16 , 0 9  . ll 
101 110 6J 78 
75% 87% 87% 87% 
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APPENDIX A . 5  
PROBIT OF LIKES AND DISLIKES IN UNITED STATES 
Likes Dislikes 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Age . 010* . 010* . 010* . 005* . 007* . 007* 
( .002) ( . 002) ( . 002) ( . 003) ( . 002) ( . 003) 
Year Elected . 002 - ---- - . 002 ---- ----
( . 006) ( . 007) 
Personal Contact . 696* -- --- . 2 30* -- ----
( . 090) ( . 102) 
Passive Contact 1 . 04 *  --- ---- . 2 30* ---- ----
( . 09) ( . 125) 
Citizen-Initiated Contact . 37* ---- ---- . 27* ---- ----
( . 11 )  ( . 1 1 )  
Secondhand Contact . 4 2* --- --- . 02 ---- ----
( . 08 )  ( . 11 )  
Secondhand Citizen- . 21* ---- ---- . 2 3* ---- ----
Initiated Contact ( . 09) ( . 10) 
Same Party as Incumbent . 32* . 30* . 31* - . 32* - . 33* - . 33* 
( . 07 )  ( . 07 )  ( . 07) ( . 09) ( . 09) ( . 09) 
Independent -. 14 - . 16+ -. 17* - .  32* - . 26* -. 30* 
( . 11 )  ( . 09) ( . 10) ( . 1 4 )  ( . 14 )  ( . 14 )  
High School - . 16* . 11+ . 10 . 2 9* . 39* . 39* 
( . 09 )  ( . 08 )  ( . 08) ( . 12) ( . 12 )  ( . 1 2 )  
So me  College -.14 . 20* . 20* . 4 9* . 65* . 66* 
( . 11 )  ( . 10) ( . 10) ( . 14 )  ( . 14 )  ( . 14 )  
College - . 05 . 33* . 32* . 5 3* . 69* . 69* 
( . 12) ( . 11 )  ( . 11 )  ( . 14 )  ( . 14 )  ( . 1 5 )  
Index ---- . 1 7* ---- ---- . 19* ----
( . 05 )  ( . 06) 
Middle Class . 06 . 14* . 14* - . 007 . 04 . 04 
( . 07) ( . 07) ( . 07) ( . 090) ( . 08 )  ( . 09) 
High Attention 
Medium Attention 
Low Attention 
Chair 
Subcommittee Chair 
Number of Caseworkers 
Solicit on TV, Radio,
Newspapers 
Handle Local Cases 
Personal Attention 
Publicizes Cases 
Constant 
ii2 
Chi-Square 
Percent Correctly 
Predicted 
* p < . 05 
** p < . 0 1  
+ p < . 10 
APPENDIX A . 5  
(continued)
Likes 
(1) (2) (3) 
. 54* . 7 3* • 72* 
( . 12 )  ( . 09) ( . 09 )  
. 48* . 42* . 4 3* 
( . 11 )  ( . 07) ( . 07 )  
. 30* ---- ----
( . 1 2 )  
- . 03 - . 10 . 0 1  
( . 1 7) ( . 20) ( . 08) 
. 06 . 1 7* . 31* 
( . 08) ( . 07 )  ( . 0 7 )  
---- ---- . 02 
( . 02) 
--
-- ---- . 39* 
( . 1 3 )  
---- ---- - . 20 
( . 07 )  
---- ---- . 1 3* 
( . 08 )  
---- ---- . lo+ 
( . 08) 
-2 . 4 6  -1 . 37 -1 . 33 
. 4 7  . 1 7  . 18 
676 376 224 
75% 64% 65% 
40
Dislikes 
(1) (2) (3) 
. 61* . 63* . 62* 
( . 17 )  ( . 1 2 )  ( . 12 )  
. 37* . 32* . 33* 
( . 17 )  ( . 11 )  ( . 11 )  
. 17 
( . 1 8 )  
. 0 9  - . 0 9  . 0 3  
( . 20) ( . 2 7 )  ( . 2 7 )  
. 15+ . 22* . 16+ 
( . 11 )  ( . 10) ( . 10) 
---- ---- . 04 *  
( . 02 )  
---- ---
-
. 2 3+ 
( . 16 )  
---- - - . 24* 
( . 09 )  
---- ---- . 28* 
( . 10) 
--- ---- - . 05 
( . 12 )  
-2 . 2 9  -2 . 2 9  -2 . 36 
. 22 . 17 . 1 9  
168 116 130 
88% 89% 89% 
